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Abstrat: This paper presents two attaks against Ahterbahn-128/80, the last version of
one of the stream ipher proposals in the eSTREAM projet. The attak against the 80-bit
variant, Ahterbahn-80, has omplexity 256.32. The attak against Ahterbahn-128 requires
275.4 operations and 261 keystream bits. These attaks are based on an improvement of the
attak due to Hell and Johansson against Ahterbahn version 2 and also on an algorithm
that makes prot of the short lengths of the onstituent registers.
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Cryptanalyse de Ahterbahn-128/80
Résumé : Ce papier présente deux attaques sur Ahterbahn-128/80, la dernière version
d'un des algorithmes proposés dans le adre de eSTREAM. L'attaque sur la version de 80
bits, Ahterbahn-80, est en 256.32. L'attaque sur Ahterbahn-128 a besoin de 275.4 aluls
et 261 bits de suite hirante. Ces attaques sont basées sur une amélioration de l'attaque
proposée par Hell et Johansson sur la version 2 d'Ahterbahn et aussi sur un algorithme qui
tire prot des petites longueurs des registres.
Mots-lés : eSTREAM, hirement à ot, Ahterbahn, attaques par orrélation, relations
de parité, ryptanalyse
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1 Introdution
Ahterbahn [4, 6℄ is a stream ipher proposal submitted to the eSTREAM projet. After the
ryptanalysis of the rst two versions [8, 7℄, it has moved on to a new one alled Ahterbahn-
128/80 [5℄ published in June 2006. Ahterbahn-128/80 orresponds to two keystream gen-
erators with key sizes of 128 bits and 80 bits, respetively. Their maximal keystream length
is limited to 263.
We present here two attaks against both generators. The attak against the 80 bit
variant, Ahterbahn-80, has omplexity 256.32. The attak against Ahterbahn-128 requires
275.4 operations and 261 keystream bits. These attaks are based on an improvement of the
attak against Ahterbahn version 2 and also on an algorithm that makes prot of the short
lengths of the onstituent registers.
The paper is organized as follows. Setion 2 presents the main speiations of Ahterbahn-
128/80. Setion 3 then desribes the general priniple of the attak proposed by Hell and
Johansson [7℄ against the previous version of the ipher Ahterbahn v2, sine our attaks rely
on a similar tehnique. We also exhibit a new attak against Ahterbahn v2 with omplexity
249.8, while the best previously known attak had omplexity 259. Setion 4 then presents
two attaks against Ahterbahn-80 and Ahterbahn-128 respetively.
1.1 Main speiations of Ahterbahn-128
Ahterbahn-128 is a keystream generator, onsisting of 13 binary nonlinear feedbak shift
registers (NLFSRs). The length of register i is Li = 21 + i for i = 0, 1, . . . , 12. These
NLFSRs are primitive in the sense that their periods Ti are equal to 2
Li − 1. The sequene
whih is used as an input to the Boolean ombining funtion is not the output sequene of
the NLFSR diretly, but a shifted version of itself. The shift amount depends on the register
number, but it is xed for eah register. In the following, xi = (xi(t))t≥0 for 0 ≤ i ≤ 12
denotes the shifted version of the output of the register i at time t.
The output of the keystream generator at time t, denoted by S(t), is the one of the
Boolean ombining funtion F with the inputs orresponding to the output sequenes of the
NLFSRs orretly shifted, i.e. S(t) = F (x0(t), . . . , x12(t)). The Boolean ombining funtion
F is given by:
F (x0, x1, ..., x12) = x0 + x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x5 + x7 + x9 + x11 + x12 + x0x5 + x2x10 +
x2x11+x4x8+x4x12+x5x6+x6x8+x6x10+x6x11+x6x12+x7x8+x7x12+x8x9+x8x10+
x9x10+x9x11+x9x12+x10x12+x0x5x8+x0x5x10+x0x5x11+x0x5x12+x1x2x8+x1x2x12+
x1x4x10 + x1x4x11 + x1x8x9 + x1x9x10 + x1x9x11 + x1x9x12 + x2x3x8 + x2x3x12 + x2x4x8 +
x2x4x10+x2x4x11+x2x4x12+x2x7x8+x2x7x12+x2x8x10+x2x8x11+x2x9x10+x2x9x11+
x2x10x12+x2x11x12+x3x4x8+x3x4x12+x3x8x9+x3x9x12+x4x7x8+x4x7x12+x4x8x9+
x4x9x12+x5x6x8+x5x6x10+x5x6x11+x5x6x12+x6x8x10+x6x8x11+x6x10x12+x6x11x12+
x7x8x9 + x7x9x12 + x8x9x10 + x8x9x11 + x9x10x12 + x9x11x12 + x0x5x8x10 + x0x5x8x11 +
x0x5x10x12 + x0x5x11x12 + x1x2x3x8 + x1x2x3x12 + x1x2x7x8 + x1x2x7x12 + x1x3x5x8 +
x1x3x5x12 + x1x3x8x9 + x1x3x9x12 + x1x4x8x10 + x1x4x8x11 + x1x4x10x12 + x1x4x11x12 +
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x1x5x7x8 + x1x5x7x12 + x1x7x8x9 + x1x7x9x12 + x1x8x9x10 + x1x8x9x11 + x1x9x10x12 +
x1x9x11x12 + x2x3x4x8 + x2x3x4x12 + x2x3x5x8 + x2x3x5x12 + x2x4x7x8 + x2x4x7x12 +
x2x4x8x10 + x2x4x8x11 + x2x4x10x12 + x2x4x11x12 + x2x5x7x8 + x2x5x7x12 + x2x8x9x10 +
x2x8x9x11 + x2x9x10x12 + x2x9x11x12 + x3x4x8x9 + x3x4x9x12 + x4x7x8x9 + x4x7x9x12 +
x5x6x8x10 + x5x6x8x11 + x5x6x10x12 + x5x6x11x12.
Its main ryptographi properties are :
 balanedness
 algebrai degree = 4
 orrelation immunity order = 8
 nonlinearity = 3584
 algebrai immunity = 4
1.2 Main speiations of Ahterbahn-80
Ahterbahn-80 onsists of 11 registers, whih are the same ones as in the above ase, exept
for the rst and the last ones. The Boolean ombining funtion, G, is a sub-funtion of F :
G(x1, . . . , x11) = F (0, x1, . . . , x11, 0).
Its main ryptographi properties are :
 balanedness
 algebrai degree = 4
 orrelation immunity order = 6
 nonlinearity = 896
 algebrai immunity = 4
As we an see, Ahterbahn-128 ontains Ahterbahn-80 as a substruture.
1.3 The key-loading algorithm
The key-loading algorithm uses the key K and an initial value IV . The method for initial-
izing the registers is the following one: rst of all, all registers are lled with the bits of
K||IV . After that, register i is loked a−Li times where a is the number of bits of K||IV ,
and the remaining bits of K||IV are added to the feedbak bit. Then, eah register outputs
one bit. Those bits are taken as input on the Boolean ombining funtion, whih outputs
INRIA
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a new bit. This bit is now added to the feedbaks for 32 additional lokings. Then we
overwrite the last ell of eah register with a 1, in order to avoid the all zero state.
This algorithm has been modied in relation to the previous versions. The aim of this
modiation is to prevent the attaker from reovering the key K from the knowledge of the
initial states of some registers.
2 Attak against Ahterbahn version 2 with omplexity
of 2
49.8
2.1 Priniple of Hell and Johansson attak against Ahterbahn v2
Ahterbahn version 2 was the previous version of Ahterbahn. The main and most important
dierenes to this last one, whih are used by the attak are that:
 it had 10 registers, with lengths between 19 and 32 bits,
 the Boolean funtion, f , had orrelation immunity order 5.
This version has been broken by Johansson and Hell [7℄. Their attak is a distinguishing
attak that relies on the following well-known lemma, whih is a partiular ase of [1, Th.
6℄.
Lemma 1 Let X be a random variable that takes its values into F2 with a distribution D
lose to the uniform distribution that is
PrD[X = 1] =
1
2
(1 + ε)with |ε| ≪ 1.
Then, for a number of samples
N =
d
ε2
where d is a real number, the error probability of the optimal distinguisher is approximately
Φ(−
√
d/2), where Φ is the distribution funtion of the standard normal distribution:
Φ(x) =
1
2π
∫ x
−∞
exp
(
− t
2
2
)
dt.
In the following, we will onsider d = 1 whih orresponds to an error probability of
about 0.3. The previous quantity ε that measures the distane between D and the uniform
distribution is alled the bias of D.
The attak proposed by Hell and Johansson exploits a quadrati approximation q of the
ombining funtion f :
q(y1, . . . , yn) =
s∑
j=1
yij +
m∑
i=1
(yjiyki)
RR n° 0123456789
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with m quadrati terms and whih satises
Pr[f(y1, . . . , yn) = q(y1, . . . , yn)] =
1
2
(1 + ε).
We build the parity-hek equations, as the ones introdued by [8℄, that make disappear
the quadrati terms by summing up:
q(t) =
s∑
j=1
xij (t) +
m∑
i=1
xji(t)xki (t)
at 2m dierent moments (t+τ) moments, where τ varies in the set of the linear ombinations
with 0− 1 oeients of Tj1Tk1 , Tj2Tk2 , . . . , TjmTkm . In the following, this set is denoted by
〈Tj1Tk1 , . . . , TjmTkm〉, i.e:
〈Tj1Tk1 , . . . , TjmTkm〉 =
{
n∑
i=1
ciTjiki , c1, . . . , cm ∈ {0, 1}
}
.
This leads to
pc(t) =
∑
τ∈〈Tj1Tk1 ,...,TjmTkm 〉
q(t+ τ)
=
∑
τ∈〈Tj1Tk1 ,...,TjmTkm 〉
(xi1(t+ τ) + . . .+ xis(t+ τ)) .
We then deimate the sequene (pc(t))t≥0 by the periods of p sequenes among (xi1(t))t≥0, . . . , (xis(t))t≥0.
We an suppose here without loss of generality that the periods of the rst p sequenes have
been hosen.
Now a new parity-hek, pcp, an be dened by:
pcp(t) = pc(tTi1 . . . Tip).
This way, the inuene of those p registers on the parity-hek pcp(t) orresponds to the
addition of a onstant for all t ≥ 0, so it will be 0 or 1 for all the parity-heks.
Now, the attak onsists in performing an exhaustive searh for the initial states of the
(s − p) remaining registers, i.e. those of indies ip+1, . . . , is. For eah possible values for
these initial states, we ompute:
σ(t) =
∑
τ∈〈Tj1Tk1 ,...,TjmTkm 〉

S(tTi1 . . . Tip + τ) + s∑
j=p+1
xij (tTi1 . . . Tip + τ)


(1)
We have
Pr[σ(t) = 0] =
1
2
(1 + ε2
m
).
Using this bias, we an distinguish the keystream (S(t))t≥0 from a random sequene and
also reover the initial states of (s− p) onstituent registers.
INRIA
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2.2 Complexity
 We will have 2m terms in eah parity-hek. That means that we need to ompute
ε−2
m+1
= 2nb2
m+1
values of σ(t) for mounting the distinguishing attak, where nb =
log2 ε
−1
. Besides, σ(t) is dened by (1), implying that the attak requires
2nb2
m+1+
Pp
j=1
Lij +
m∑
i=1
2Lji+Lki keystream bits,
where Lij are the lengths of the registers assoiated to the periods by whih we have
deimated, and the last term orresponds to the maximal distane between the bits
involved in eah parity-hek.
 Time omplexity will be
2m2nb2
m+1+
Ps
j=p+1
Lij
where ip+1, . . . , is are the indies of the registers by whih period we have not de-
imated, so the registers over whom we have made an exhaustive searh and whose
initial state we are going to nd.
2.3 Example with Ahterbahn version 2
Hell and Johansson [7℄ have used this attak against Ahterbahn version 2 with the following
quadrati approximation:
Q(x1, . . . , x10) = x1 + x2 + x3x8 + x4x6.
Then, they deimate by the period of the seond register, whose length is 22. After that, they
make an exhaustive searh over the rst register, whose length is 19. Time omplexity will
be 262 and data omplexity 259.02. Using the small lengths of the registers, time omplexity
an be redued below data omplexity, so the nal omplexity of the attak will be 259.02.
2.4 Improvement of the Attak against Ahterbahn version 2
We are going to improve the previously desribed attak against Ahterbahn v2 and we
redue the omplexity to 249.8.
For this attak, we use the idea of assoiating the variables in order to redue the number
of terms that we will have in the parity-heks. The only eet that this ould have on the
nal omplexity of the attak is to enlarge the number of required keystream bits; but being
areful, we make it stay the same while reduing the time omplexity.
The hosen approximation. At rst, we searhed between all the quadratis approx-
imations of f with one and two quadrati terms, as the original attak presented by Hell
and Johansson was based on a quadrati approximation. Finally, after looking after a trade-
o between the number of terms, the number of variables, the bias... we found that none
RR n° 0123456789
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quadrati approximation was better for this attak than linear ones. It is worth notiing
that, sine the ombining funtion f is 5-resilient, any approximation of f involves at least
6 input variables. Moreover, the highest bias orresponding to an approximation of f by a
6-variable funtion is ahieved by a funtion of degree one as proved in [3℄. After analyzing
all linear approximations of the Boolean ombining funtion, we found that the best one
was:
g(x1, . . . , x10) = x8 + x6 + x4 + x3 + x2 + x1.
We have f(x1, . . . , x10) = g(x1, . . . , x10) with a probability of
1
2 (1 + 2
−3).
Parity-heks. Let us build a parity-hek as follows:
ggg(t) = g(t) + g(t+ T1T8) + g(t+ T2T6) + g(t+ T1T8 + T2T6),
with
g(t) = x8(t) + x6(t) + x4(t) + x3(t) + x2(t) + x1(t).
The terms x8, x6, x2, x1 will disappear and, so, ggg(t) is a sequene that depends uniquely on
the sequenes x3 and x4. Adding four times the approximation has the eet of multiplying
the bias four times, so the bias of
σ(t) = S(t) + S(t+ T1T8) + S(t+ T2T6) + S(t+ T1T8 + T2T6)
is 2−3×4 = 2−12 beause 4 is the number of terms in ggg(t). That means that we will need
23×4×2 = 224 values of the parity-hek for deteting this bias. If we deimate ggg(t) by the
period of register 3, we will need
224T3 + T1T8 + T2 + T6 = 2
24+23 + 229+19 + 227+22
= 249.8 bits of keystream,
and time omplexity will be
224 × 2L4 = 249
as we only guess the initial state of register 4.
We onsider that the total omplexity is given by the data omplexity, as it is higher
than the time omplexity. This omplexity is 249.8 while the omplexity of the previous
attak was equal to 259.
3 Cryptanalysis of Ahterbahn-128/80
Now, we desribe a new attak against Ahterbahn-80 with a omplexity of 256.32 where a
linear approximation of the output funtion is onsidered. The attak is a distinguishing
attak but it also allows to reover the initial states of ertain onstituent registers. We also
desribe an attak against Ahterbahn-128 with a omplexity of 275.4 where we onsider a
linear approximation of the output funtion and we make prot of the short lengths of the
registers involved in the proposed stream ipher.
INRIA
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3.1 Cryptanalysis of Ahterbahn-80
This attak is very similar to the improvement of the attak against Ahterbahn version 2
whih has been desribed in the previous setion.
Our attak exploits the following linear approximation of the ombining funtion G:
ℓ(x1, . . . , x11) = x1 + x3 + x4 + x5 + x6 + x7 + x10.
Sine G is 6-resilient, ℓ is the best approximation by a 7-variable funtion.
For ℓ(t) = x1(t) + x3(t) + x4(t) + x5(t) + x6(t) + x7(t) + x10(t), the keystream (S(t))t≥0
satises Pr[S(t) = ℓ(t)] = 12 (1 − 2−3).
Parity-heks. Let us build a parity-hek as follows:
ℓℓ(t) = ℓ(t) + ℓ(t+ T4T7) + ℓ(t+ T6T5) + ℓ(t+ T4T7 + T6T5).
The terms ontaining the sequenes x4, x5, x6, x7 vanish in ℓℓ(t), so ℓℓ(t) depends exlusively
on the sequenes x1, x3 and x10.
Adding four times the approximation has the eet of multiplying the bias four times,
so the bias of
σ(t) = S(t) + S(t+ T7T4) + S(t+ T6T5) + S(t+ T7T4 + T6T5)
where (S(t))t≥0 is the keystream, is 2
−4×3
. This means that we need 23×4×2 = 224 parity-
heks σ(t) to detet this bias.
We now deimate σ(t) by the period of the register 10, whih is involved in the parity-
hek, so we reate like this a new parity-hek:
σ′(t) = σ(t(231 − 1)).
Then, the attak performs an exhaustive searh for the initial states of registers 1 and 3. Its
time omplexity is 224 × 2L1+L3 = 270.
The number of keystream bits that we need is
224 × T10 + T4T7 + T6T5 = 256.32
.
3.2 Cryptanalysis of Ahterbahn-128
Now, we present a distinguishing attak against the 128-bit version of Ahterbahn whih
also reovers the initial states of two registers.
We onsider the following approximation of the ombining funtion F :
ℓ(x0, . . . , x12) = x0 + x3 + x7 + x4 + x10 + x8 + x9 + x1 + x2.
Then, for ℓ(t) = x0(t)+x3(t)+x7(t)+x4(t)+x10(t)+x8(t)+x9(t)+x1(t)+x2(t), we have
Pr[S(t) = ℓ(t)] = 12 (1 + 2
−3).
RR n° 0123456789
10 Naya Plasenia
Parity-heks. The period of any sequene obtained by ombining the registers 0, 3 and
7 is equal to lm(T0, T3, T7), i.e. 2
59.3
as T0 T3 and T7 have ommon divisors. We are going
to denote this value by T0,3,7.
If we build a parity hek as follows:
ℓℓℓ(t) =
∑
τ∈〈T0,3,7,T4,10,T8,9〉
ℓ(t+ τ),
the terms ontaining the sequenes x0, x3, x7, x4, x10, x8, x9 will disappear from ℓℓℓ(t), so
ℓℓℓ(t) depends exlusively on the sequenes x1 and x2:
ℓℓℓ(t) =
∑
τ∈〈T0,3,7,T4,10,T8,9〉
ℓ(t+ τ)
=
∑
τ∈〈T0,3,7,T4,10,T8,9〉
x1(t+ τ) + x2(t+ τ)
= σ1(t) + σ2(t),
where σ1(t) and σ2(t) are the parity-heks alulated on the sequenes generated by NLFSRs
1 and 2.
Adding eight times the approximation has the eet of multiplying the bias eight times,
so the bias of
σ(t) =
∑
τ∈〈T0,3,7,T4,10,T8,9〉
S(t+ τ)
where (S(t))t≥0 is the keystream, is 2
−8×3
. So:
Pr[σ(t) + σ1(t) + σ2(t) = 1] =
1
2
(1− ε8).
This means that we need 23×8×2 = 248 values of σ(t) + σ1(t) + σ2(t) to detet this bias.
We now desribe an algorithm for omputing the sum σ(t)+σ1(t)+σ2(t) over all values
of t. This algorithm has a lower omplexity than an exhaustive searh for the initial states
of the registers 1 and 2 simultaneously. Here we use (248 − 2) values of t sine (248 − 2) =
T2 × (225 + 2).
INRIA
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We an write it down as follows:
248−3∑
t′=0
σ(t′)⊕ ℓℓℓ(t′) =
T2−1∑
k=0
225+1∑
t=0
σ(T2t+ k)⊕ ℓℓℓ(T2t+ k)
=
T2−1∑
k=0
225+1∑
t=0
σ(T2t+ k)⊕ σ1(T2t+ k)⊕ σ2(T2t+ k)
=
T2−1∑
k=0

(σ2(k)⊕ 1)

225+1∑
t=0
σ(T2t+ k)⊕ σ1(T2t+ k)

 +
σ2(k)

(225 + 2)− 2
25+1∑
t=0
σ(T2t+ k)⊕ σ1(T2t+ k)



 ,
sine σ2(T2t+ k) is onstant for a xed value of k.
At this point, we an obtain σ(t) from the keystream and we an make an exhaustive
searh for the initial state of register 1. More preisely:
 We hoose an initial state for register 2, e.g. the all one initial state. We ompute and
save a binary vetor V2 of length T2:
V2[k] = σ2(k),
where the sequene x2 is generated from the hoosen initial state. The omplexity of
this state is T2 × 23 operations.
 For eah possible initial state of register 1:
 we ompute and save a vetor V1 omposed of T2 integers of 26 bits.
V1[k] =
225+1∑
t=0
σ(T2t+ k)⊕ σ1(T2t+ k).
The omplexity of this state is:
248 × (24 + 24.7) = 253.4
for eah possible initial state of register 1, where 24 orresponds to the number
of operations required for omputing eah (σ(t) + σ1(t)) and (2
25 + 2) × 24.7 =
(225 + 2)× 26 is the ost of summing up 225 + 2 integers of 26 bits.
 For eah possible i from 0 to T2 − 1:
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* we dene V ′2 of length T2:
V ′2 [k] = V2[k + i mod T2].
Atually, (V ′2 [k])k<T2 orresponds to (σ2(k))k<T2 when the initial state of
register 2 orresponds to internal state after loking R2 i times from the all
one initial state.
* With the two vetors that we have obtained, we ompute:
T2−1∑
k=0
[
(V ′2 [k]⊕ 1)V1[k] + V ′2 [k]
(
225 + 2− V1[k]
)]
. (2)
When we do this with the orret initial states of registers 1 and 2, we will nd the
expeted bias.
for eah possible initial state of R1 do
for k = 0 to T2 − 1 do
V1[k] =
∑225+1
t=0 σ(T2t+ k)⊕ σ1(T2t+ k)
end for
for eah possible initial i state of R2 do
for k = 0 to T2 − 1 do
V ′2 [k] = V2[k + i mod T2]
end for∑T2−1
k=0
[
(V ′2 [k]⊕ 1)V1[k] + V ′2 [k]
(
225 + 2− V1[k]
)]
if we nd the bias then
return the initial states of R1 and R2
end if
end for
end for
Table 1: Algorithm for nding the initial states of registers 1 and 2
The total time omplexity of the attak is going to be:
T1 ×
[
248 × (24 + 24.7)+ T2 × 2× T2 × 24.7]+ T2 × 23 = 275.4,
where 2× T2 × 24.7 is the time it takes to ompute the sum desribed by (2). Atually, we
an speed up the proess by rewriting the sum (2) in the following way
T2−1∑
k=0
(−1)V2[k+i]
(
V1[k]− 2
25 + 2
2
)
+ T2
225 + 2
2
The issue is now to nd the i that maximizes this sum, this is the same as omputing the
maximum of the rossorrelation of two sequenes of length T2. We an do that eiently
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using a fast Fourier transform as explained in [2, pages 306-312℄. The nal omplexity will
be in O(T2 log T2). Anyway, this does not hange our total omplexity as the higher term is
the rst one.
The omplexity is going to be, nally:
T1 ×
[
248 × (24 + 24.7)+O(T2 logT2)] + T2 × 23 = 275.4.
The length of keystream needed is:
T0,3,7 + T4,10 + T8,9 + 2
48 < 261 bits.
4 Conlusion
We have proposed an attak against Ahterbahn-80 in 270. To this attak we an apply the
same algorithm as the one desribed in Setion 3.2 against Ahterbahn-128, and its time
omplexity will be redued to about 245, so we an onsider as the total omplexity the
length of the keystream needed, sine it is bigger. The omplexity of the attak against
Ahterbahn-80 will then be 256.32. An attak against Ahterbahn-128 is also proposed in
275.4 where fewer than 261 bits of keystream are required. The omplexities of the best
attaks against all versions of Ahterbahn are summarized in the following table:
version data omplexity time omplexity referenes
v1 (80-bit) 232 255 [8℄
v2 (80-bit) 259.02 262 [7℄
v2 (80-bit) 249.8 249
v80 (80-bit) 256.32 246
v128 (128-bit) 260 275.4
Table 2: Attaks omplexities against all versions of Ahterbahn
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